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China - Asiatic Watchdog.

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It will take years for China to overcome her present primitive state.

China—Asiatic Watchdog

We Are Looking To This Nation To Keep
The Orient In Line. Can She Do The Job?

By Cpl. KLAUS MANN
Staff Writer

WHAT WAS, in the last analysis, the cause of the war between the United States and Japan? The answer is simple: America was attacked because she would not accept Japanese hegemony over China. Had she been willing to do so, there might have been no Pearl Harbor. But she was not willing—the sovereignty and independence of China are matters of vital interest to the United States.

There are two main objectives America seeks in the Far East. The first is the so-called Open-Door Policy—which means the preservation of equal opportunity for the trade of China. The second is the establishment of a state of international relations in Asia and the Pacific in which peace can be maintained. These two purposes are closely interrelated, but the second is more essential than the first. For the first—free trade with China—will come about almost automatically if the second can be attained.

AMERICA'S paramount war aim in the Far East was and is the elimination of the threat of war in that part of the world. And to insure peace in Asia, the United Nations in general, and the United States in particular, want and need a strong and independent China. A weak or chaotic China might become once more a focus of international rivalries. As before, such rivalries would probably tend to degenerate into general conflicts in which the United States might be compelled to join. In short, China's position

in the system of postwar security is of primary importance to the future peace of the world.

What are the potentialities of China for the preservation of world peace and security? How, and to what extent, will China be able to protect herself against aggression? Will China be in a position to play the role in world politics for which she seems qualified as the greatest Asiatic power? Will she maintain and develop her present status as one of the "Big Four"—together with the United States, Great Britain and the Soviet Union?

AMONG THE factors determining a nation's potential military and economic power, none is more basic than its population. As far as this fundamental national asset—namely manpower—is concerned, China's resources are indeed almost unlimited. It is impossible to secure reliable statistics regarding her total population. Various estimates made at different times during the period since 1900 range between 275 and 600 millions. The latest official Chinese estimate, made by the Ministry of Interior in 1940, is 459,339,704. China's population is thus the largest of any state located in a single territorial area. It is exceeded only by that of the British Empire, the political units of which are scattered all over the world. An accurate census might even show that China's total population exceeded the figure of 557,060,150 accepted for the British Empire. It has been said that one of every five persons in the world is a Chinese.

But China's prestige and importance is not only due to its vast physical dimensions. As the one Asiatic country that has maintained its independence

against both East and West, China is in position to exert great moral authority in the Orient. It is Chinese civilization—one of the most ancient and most refined civilizations in the world—to which all the Asiatic nations owe most of their cultural traditions.

THIS ALMOST fabulous age of Chinese civilization, while on the one hand contributing decisively to China's grandeur and authority, on the other hand is the essential source of the country's present weakness. As with all very ancient social and cultural systems, Chinese civilization had, and still has, a tendency to abide by its time-honored institutions. For several centuries, China—ruled by a line of decadent emperors—has been completely static and completely isolationist. The Taoist-Confucianist doctrine—the age-old philosophy which has been instrumental in shaping the typically Chinese attitude toward life—recommends quietism, patience, moderation, peace; it is anti-progressive, anti-heroic, anti-imperialistic. The Imperial China, self-sufficient by virtue of its colossal size, had just one ambition—to be left alone. The Great Wall was a symbol—separating the Chinese Empire from the rest of the world. While the other countries were moving forward, China was standing still. While the West was learning, in the 19th century, the use of the machine and was becoming industrialized, China remained socially and technically backward, undeveloped, unable to compete with any modern nation.

IN 1911 the 300-year dynasty of the Manchus was overthrown and China became a somewhat chaotic republic. As a first gesture to demonstrate their

new independence, Chinese republicans cut off their pigtails in public meetings. Dr. Sun Yat-sen, father of that revolution, left as guidance for his followers what are known as the *Three Principles of the People*. These principles have been translated as: national emancipation and racial equality; political rights for the people; economic rights for the workers and peasants.

The revolutionary process which started in 1911 has by no means been completed: it is still going on. To the more progressive elements among the Chinese people, even the war against Japan was a part of this continuous revolution. It was not simply a war to resist an external enemy but, simultaneously, a struggle to bring about political and economic reconstruction on the basis of Sun's Three Principles.

MAYBE IT was this revolutionary spirit, more than anything else, which helped the Chinese people in resisting a ruthless, materially superior enemy. In 1934 Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek told his Officers' Training Corps with remarkable frankness: "From the standpoint of military preparedness, we do not possess attributes which would enable us to preserve our position as an independent nation. We are not fit to be called a modern state." Yet when the Japanese invasion came in 1937, the Chinese power of resistance proved much stronger than the aggressor had anticipated. With three-quarters of their vast country occupied, the Chinese went on fighting—notwithstanding their critical weakness in modern armaments. The Japanese utterly failed in breaking Chinese morale.

Yet the Chinese war effort was handicapped—at times in an alarming degree—by the same shortcomings which are now complicating or endangering the task of Chinese reconstruction. The great obstacles China will have to overcome if she wants to factually maintain her place as a leading nation, are, first, her technical and educational backwardness and, second, her political disunity.

AS FOR the educational backwardness, it may be sufficient to say that the number of illiterate persons in China is 360,000,000, according to a recent official estimate. Even if the Chinese Government makes serious efforts to reduce this frightening figure within the coming years—the problem of illiteracy is an extremely grave one in China and cannot be solved quickly.

Nor will it be possible for China to remold her life to large-scale industrialization in the near future. It is true that China is now modernizing and will continue to do so at an increasing tempo. But all well-informed observers agree that it will take many years before the great Oriental nation will have completely overcome her present state of almost medieval primitivity. David N. Rowe—an American author born and brought up in China and at present Research Associate at the Institute of International Studies at Yale University, points out in his book *China among the Powers* that the supposed "vast riches" of China are to a great extent illusory; that the country's overpopulation, under present conditions, is a weakness rather than a strength—("China's population problems are those of surplus, not of shortage"); that China's political and social backwardness has affected every aspect of Chinese life, in both war and peace.

CHINA IS poor in natural resources. She is one of the richest countries in the world in coal, and has a virtual monopoly on certain of the rarer metals, such as tungsten. But in iron her known reserves would last only nine years at the annual U. S. rate of consumption. Her situation as to oil is even worse. In other words, China will have to import—not only cheap consumer goods but also raw materials; not just textiles, cosmetics and knick-knacks, but heavy industrial machinery, road-making machinery, harbor and power-plant equipment—all the apparatus of an industrial system.

That is where the responsibility of the other great powers comes in—and their business interest, too. Given freedom from obstruction, the Chinese market may be expected to live up to the enormous expectations which have tempted the West for a century and thus far remained illusory. And America's share in this colossal market on a basis of free competition, should contribute materially toward carrying our country over the years of difficult adjustment back to a peace economy.

A prominent Chinese businessman,
(Please turn to Page 12)

sockets of most homes. One pound of uranium contains a potential destructive force strong enough to catapult the Empire State Building 20 miles into the air or to send one square mile of Manhattan skyscrapers sailing 600 feet high. The entire population of Manhattan—1,500,000—as well as the island itself, could be destroyed by the explosion of 13 pounds of uranium.

The race to split the atom was so close that it is believed the uranium atom actually was split in different laboratories in several countries, all within the space of two or three weeks.

The U-235 atom was smashed much more easily than had been expected. Instead of neutrons fired with tremendous energy in a sledge-hammer manner, it was found that neutrons traveling relatively slow but extremely accurately split the uranium atom in a short time.

The Japanese never had a chance against the atom bomb. Our scientists tried more than 5,000 possible ways of combatting it before it ever was released. None of the 5,000 was successful. A piece of U-235 the size of a pinhead contains 50 million million million atoms. If you don't believe it, count 'em.

But in spite of everything that has been said here, there still is no real cause for jitters over the world's future. The potential explosive force in an atom is tempered by the fact that all these dire estimates have been made upon the complete disintegration of the atom. So far, it appears that science has been able only to split one, releasing about one percent of its explosive power.

Slight Errors

The newspaper PM has a hobby indulged in by no other U. S. paper to an equal extent. It likes to check back and see what happened to the batting average of professional forecasters. Last week, PM announced that its clippings indicate that the people "who gave the worst advice on the war were those within or close to the old isolationist-America First group." Some of the forecasts:

Martin Dies of the Dies Committee: "In my judgment, Hitler will be in control of Russia within 30 days"—June 24, 1941. Dr. Robert M. Hutchins: "I speak tonight because I believe that the American people are about to commit suicide. We are not planning to. We have no plan. We are drifting into suicide."—Jan. 23, 1941. The New York Daily News: "War with Japan... would be madness"—Dec. 1, 1941. The New York Journal-American: "... But let us not too trustfully send all our arms to support Russia. We may need some to oppose Russia if later she should line up with Japan"—March 30, 1942. Herbert Hoover: "Does any sane person believe that by military means we can defeat two-thirds of the military power of the whole world in even years and years?"

WHEN THE FIRST ATOMIC bomb fell on Japan, its inventors found themselves in the same position as another scientist almost 80 years ago when he, too, invented an amazing new instrument of destruction. That headline maker was Alfred Nobel, the inventor of dynamite. Like the scientists of today, Nobel had hoped that his new destructive power would contribute to the peace of the world. He sought to assure peace by leaving the fortune which dynamite brought him to the establishment of the Nobel prizes. But strangely enough, even here the ideas of the idealistic Swede backfired in the production of a more powerful explosive. For at least four of the scientists mentioned in the news' dispatches as co-inventors of the atomic bomb have been Nobel prize winners. Nobel was born into an explosive-minded family; the father—Immanuel Nobel—was the inventor of a submarine mine which the Russians used in the Crimea War. In 1863 father and son moved from St. Petersburg to the family's native Sweden to start the manufacture of nitroglycerine. The newly-discovered nitroglycerine, however, was an uncertain thing that had to be handled with extra care and special skill. Men feared the explosive because of its treacherous action and nations legislated against it. Finally, after several disastrous explosions, Nobel combined nitroglycerine with an absorbent substance called kieselguhr, and produced... dynamite! Safe to transport, yet easy to detonate with dynamite caps, the yellow sticks have remained the standard

Headline Makers

commercial explosive ever since. The discovery brought Nobel instant success. His explosives business spread around the world and at his death he left more than nine million dollars in a trust fund to provide annual awards for leaders in five fields—physics, chemistry, physiology and medicine, literature, and peace. Through the years these awards have amounted to about 40,000 dollars each. Like some scientists of today, Nobel once thought that overwhelming power and terror might bring an end to wars. But in the same year, he also wrote that he was "beginning to believe that the only true solution would be a convention under which all governments would bind themselves to defend collectively any country that was attacked."

RAMSEY MacDonald, like Alfred Nobel, is dead, but even in death the events of the day make him a headline maker. With the Labor Party now in power in England, historians recall that Ramsay MacDonald was Labor's first Prime Minister. A life-long social re-

former, MacDonald was labeled a traitor from 1914 to 1918 because of his pacifist beliefs. When the war fever finally subsided in the early 1920s, he made a political comeback, becoming leader of the Labor Party in 1922 and later Prime Minister. His rich Scottish eloquence, his instinctive air of leadership, his poise and parliamentary skill, and his undoubted courage promptly made him a world figure. His first Labor Government lasted nine months of 1924 and then fell amid the squabbles of the radicals and the moderates. In 1929 Labor — and MacDonald — took over again, and once more Labor found itself in difficulty. The domestic problems soon were staggering. The depression swept England. The nation was going deeper and deeper into debt. Finally, when MacDonald demanded that the dole be reduced and the budget balanced, the Labor Party disowned him and for the next four years he ruled with a conservative regime. In making his party break, MacDonald won the cheers of many for putting the interests of his country over his own career and his party, but Labor spokesmen still speak scathingly of him as a "renegade." His expulsion from the party spiked Labor's chances and many of its best men were beaten at the polls. Some of its left-wingers deserted, while one faction, led by Sir Oswald Moseley, formed a Fascist organization. After giving way to Baldwin as Prime Minister, MacDonald died suddenly in 1937—a lonely and almost forgotten figure.

—E. W.

It would be a Children's Crusade"—June 29, 1941. Charles S. Lindbergh: "This war (is) lost... It is not within our power today to win the war for England, even though we throw the entire resources of our nation into the conflict"—April 17, 1941. Joseph P. Kennedy: "I cannot see where we could get enough ships to carry the necessary arms and equipment... Further, I don't know where our Army would go if we started off to fight a war."—Jan. 18, 1941.

EUROPE

Munich Purge, 1945

Another purge is on in Munich—but this time, it's not the Nazis who do the purging; it's the U. S. Military Government — which is to say that the current purge, far from being a violent affair, is being handled in a legal, orderly fashion. Yet it is a political house-cleaning of rather impressive size. Special inves-

tigation agents have removed 29,898 persons from the civil service within the past 90 days, while numerous former Gestapo and Nazi leaders have been jailed and are now held for trial.

The most prominent German official to be ousted in Bavaria is Col. Hans von Seisser, appointed chief of police by American authorities shortly after VE-Day. His removal will be hailed in many quarters as the overdue correction of a gross political blunder. Von Seisser's appointment has been widely criticized by the liberal press in Britain and the United States. The man whom Col. Charles E. Keegan, head of the Allied Military Government in Munich, made chief of police of the Bavarian capital does not have the kind of record that would qualify him for such a responsible job. Instrumental in stemming democratic uprisings in Bavaria after World War I, he is the same Von Seisser who stood behind Hitler on the platform of the beer hall from which the future Nazi Fuehrer directed his ill-fated putsch in 1923. Named Reichsminister of Police by Hitler, Von Seisser accepted this "honor" before the eyes of

thousands of people assembled in the hall.

The fact that Von Seisser has now been replaced by a Social Democrat, Frank Pitzer, seems to indicate that Colonel Keegan—a former New York City Councilman and a supporter of Ed Flynn's Bronx Democratic machine—may finally have decided, or may have been advised, to change his policy in running Bavarian affairs. It was Colonel Keegan who, in a conversation with New York Post columnist Leonard Lyons, made the oft-quoted statement that the Germans have "no rights." In another interview the Colonel emphasized that he wanted no political activities "at this time" and that he did not trust any of the Bavarian anti-fascist movements. And only a few days later, he had discovered the strictly "unpolitical" Col. von Seisser.

Small Fry Dictator


Spain is much bigger and more populous than her little neighbor Portugal, which is about as big as Indiana and contains fewer people than New York City. Being bigger and more populous and also occupying a more strategic position in Europe, Spain has been forced to undergo much more scrutiny of its government than tiny Portugal had ever had to put up with. Even now, while Francisco Franco is juggling regents in a desperate attempt to maintain his falangist grip, Antonio Salazar, next door in Portugal, strongarms his way along with scarcely a foreigner taking notice.

Unique among dictators, Salazar holds the posts of Premier, Minister of War, Minister of Finance and Minister of Foreign Affairs. The ostensible ruler of Portugal is General Antonio Carmona, who has been President since 1935, but Salazar is the boss, even though he calls Portugal a "dictatorship without a dictator." 56-year-old Salazar, a one-time economics professor, has told the world that his role of dictator was forced upon him. History does not bear him out, however.

Salazar's sympathy with fascist ideals have been openly censored; his outright aid to Franco during the Spanish Civil War has been admitted. Portugal's record as a neutral during World War II has been shady. A traditional ally of Great Britain, she nevertheless declared May 3 as a day of mourning for Hitler. Her only major help to the Allies was permission to use the Azores as an Allied base.

Antonio Salazar has declared that no matter what happens to dictatorship in the rest of Europe, it will not leave Portugal. Salazar's continued rule, however, depends as it always has on friendship with Britain. Since Labor's landslide, Salazar has been quiet, but he knows that Portugal's overseas empire, 23 times as big as the homeland, depends for its protection on the British Navy. Britain's Labor Party has not forgotten that Salazar rose to power over the crushing of a labor movement. And the United Nations are not forgetful of the fact that the USSR refused to attend the Chicago Air Conference on the grounds that Portugal was represented.

WAR • POPULATION SHIFTS AND CITY GROWTH SINCE PEARL HARBOR



Asiatic Watchdog

Chih Tsang—since 1941 General Secretary of the Universal Trading Corporation, official purchasing agency in the U. S. of the Chinese Government—has made the following estimate: "By supplying about 208,000,000 (million) dollars worth of goods each year in the immediate postwar period, the United States will easily take the commanding position in China's import trade; in other words, probably about 43 percent of China's postwar purchases will be made in the United States."

THIS OPTIMISTIC view seems to be shared by Donald M. Nelson, whom President Roosevelt sent to China last winter to study that country's military and economic situation. Mr. Nelson concluded his report on this mission with the following words: "The success of China's venture in planned war production, if properly followed up through American Government and business channels, will make for close postwar economic relations between China and the United States. China has the capacity and the desire to develop herself industrially with American aid. If that aid is realistically planned, and if financial arrangements are put on a sound basis, China should soon after the war begin to replace Japan as the leading industrial nation of the Orient. In that event, a market of enormous size should progressively open up for American export industries. I believe, too, that with American guidance China's development can be turned into peaceful and democratic channels, eliminating much of the fear of war which has for so long shaped political attitudes in the Orient and South Pacific."

It is only in his last sentence that Mr. Nelson refers—however discreetly and diplomatically—to the most ominous aspect of the whole Chinese question: namely, the disturbing confusion and lability of that country's political setup. It is this factor of political disunity and continuous social tension which darkens the prospects not only of Chinese industrialization but also of peace in China and Asia. Will it indeed be possible to turn the country's vast potential energies "into peaceful and democratic channels"—with or without American guidance?

AT PRESENT, China is by no means a democracy. Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, in a New Year's message last January, promised his people a democratic form of government, "as soon as the war is over." But right now China has only one recognized political party, the *Kuomintang*. This has been the case since 1927. And the *Kuomintang* which rules China also maintains concentration camps, secret "Courts," an official Youth Corps, rigid control of press, thought-control in all educational institutions, and an alarmingly Gestapo-like Secret State Police.

With this whole apparatus of power not to say terror, the *Kuomintang* regime has never succeeded in extending its control over the entire country. In regions more remote from the capital, Chungking, the presence of fully autonomous local regimes must be noted. Best known of these is, of course, the Communist regime in northern and western China, centered in northern Shensi.

The conflict between Chiang Kai-shek's Government and the Chinese Reds—a conflict which has never completely ceased throughout the whole war against Japan—seems to be now approaching a new critical phase. A desperate struggle for weapons and power is on between the two fighting parties. The spectre of civil war is very real in China once again.

BUT NO MATTER what the immediate future may have in store for the Chinese people—one thing is certain about China: she is somehow, some way, on the march. The country may be torn by internal dissension; it may at the moment be a political fiction that the Chinese Republic is one of the Big Four. Nevertheless, despite the melancholy picture the land now presents — China is truly an awakening giant, sprawling, confused and uncertain, stumbling to her feet clumsily and then falling again. But her natural vitality cannot permanently be kept down. At once over-aged and primitive as a social organism, the Oriental colossus will need some time to adapt itself to the conditions and requirements of modern life. But there is no reason to doubt that China eventually will succeed.