

Verbundkatalog Kalliope

Occupation - Trial or Error?

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44

W. W.

Now to a high degree this is precisely the feeling prevalent in Germany today - a feeling that would not appear to testify to the success of the occupation. But then nobody - no nation under the sun - likes to be defeated and occupied and according to its own standards the American occupation of Germany might be wholly successful ~~any~~ notwithstanding ~~any~~ German lack of appreciation.

In order to ~~size up our~~ ^{the German Laboratory} accomplishment in occupied Germany, we shall first of all have to ~~determine~~ ^{just} what it was that we wanted to accomplish. ~~For~~ Unless we are quite clear what to our minds [would have constituted success / we can hardly say whether or not we've been successful. Now - our main goals, our chief targets in occupied Germany were decided upon - and they were announced - long before VE day. Germany, we declared, was to be rendered harmless, and she was to stay harmless, we'd see to that. In close cooperation with our war time allies we'd ~~continue to hold down~~ ^{run} her war potential, we'd control her industrial output and do away with nazism, militarism and imperialism. As for the German people, they'd be thoroughly re-educated ^{being gradually transformed} with a view to ~~transforming~~ ^{transforming} into a nation of peace-loving democrats. Germany, ~~in fact, was eventually to~~ ^{in fact, was eventually to} become a useful and affectionate member of that great ^{big} happy family of nations of which the U.N. was but the ^{as small} nucleus. But then, if, or rather since, we ^w wanted the Germans to turn useful and affectionate, we must not, of course, permit them to be destitute and furious. Their ^{Consequently, Germany's} ^{announced} economic recovery within the limits set by our determination to

render and keep her harmless was ~~hhhhhhhhhhhh~~ one of the chief goals of our occupation policy.

~~hhhh~~ Three and a half years after the Reich's unconditional surrender have all or any of these chief ^{missions} ~~aims~~ been accomplished? The sad truth is that none - but not one of this goals has been ^{reached} achieved. There cannot, I think, be any argument as for the validity of this statement which neither Secretary of State Marshall nor General Clay, the ~~hhhhhhhh~~ Military governor of the American Zone in Germany - much - ^{dispute} would care to question. Even so, however, the question remains, how with the best of initial intentions; with a fair number of capable men heading and direction ^{ing} the occupation; with enormous means ^{backing} ~~hhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhh~~ the American authorities in Germany and prodigious amounts actually spent; the question remains how, under conditions that could not in any way be called ^{disaster} unfavorable, we managed to arrange for the gigantic mess ~~hhhh~~ which ^{is today's Germany} ~~hhhhhhhhhh~~ our German venture has turned out to be?

In trying to answer this all important question I shall not commence by dealing with the Germans. For while they, too, their negative attitude, their unchanged hearts and minds, their ^{refusal} ~~lack of~~ cooperation, ^{to} their passive resistance and their active sabotage ~~hhhh~~ ^{were} ~~hhhhhhhhhh~~ have contributed - as they meant to ~~hh~~ - to our failure, we should hardly have succeeded even if the Germans had chosen to behave like a bunch of ^{veritable} ~~hhhhhhhhhh~~ arch angels. For oddly enough the ^{blue} causes for our German flop do not lie in or anywhere near Germany. They lie in Washington and Moscow, ^{main}

Let's take our ~~hhhhhhhhhh~~ ^{initial} targets in occupied Germany the ones I've just listed for you - let's take them up individually and let's find out why they ^{have not} ~~were not~~, indeed why ^{most} ~~many~~ of them couldn't ^{not}

possibly have been reached. Why couldn't they? Simply because they ceased to be honest targets, because as such they were dropped and abandoned very early in the game and when the occupation was still a ^{delicate} babe in arms.

Germany, we have said, was to be "rendered - and kept harmless". Yes, - but she was also to ^{serve as} ~~be~~ an advanced basis in the American struggle against Soviet Russia. By no means must her war potential be destroyed; quite the contrary, it must be strengthened as thoroughly and as swiftly as ^{and Americanly} ~~humanly~~ possible. Europe's industrial heart, the Ruhr, must be mightily invigorated; in fact ~~the heavy industries which enabled Germany to wage~~ ^{eventually} ~~the heavy industries which enabled Germany to wage~~ 5 aggressive war within 70 years must be made the very core and center of the Marshall plan which is not - or to be ^{which is} ~~conservative~~ ^{by no means} ~~meant to further~~ merely a scheme ~~at the economic recovery of Western Europe~~ ^{the continent} which is ^{design for} ~~the military, economic and~~ but also and above all a ~~the military, economic and~~ ^{the} ~~political~~ ^{continent} ~~fortification and coordination of~~ ^{or that part of it which is not Soviet dominated -} ~~under American control.~~ (Go on with "Phantom Victory")

Years ago - I believe it was in 1943, at a time that is, when the war was far from won - a book was published in New York ~~author -~~ ^{the book} ~~the title of which intrigued me~~ even then. The book was called "Phantom Victory" and it pictured in a utopian way the decade between 1945 and 1955 and the manner in which during that period of time we were going to loose the peace. ^{is only natural,} As ~~was~~ ^{is only natural,} not all of the author's daring predictions have since come true; but one of his main prophecies ^{is on the verge of being} ~~fulfilled.~~ ^{The United States, ventured,} ~~shockingly correct:~~ ^{shockingly correct:} ~~he~~ ^{he} ~~would re-arm Germany against~~ ^{would re-arm Germany against} Russia; ~~While Britain, France and the rest of Western Europe would also be~~

be drawn

into our game, ~~phantom victory~~ game, and while they, too would receive some financial aid from across the Atlantic, it would be the gigantic powerhouse of the Ruhr ~~which~~ ⁱⁿ we'd ~~invest~~ really invest and that ~~phantom victory~~ would play the most important part by far; and since it would be the Germans themselves on whom we'd have to rely regarding the huge ~~phantom victory~~ and steady flow of war materials which we'd want to emanate from the Ruhr, Germany would ~~phantom victory~~ regain a shocking amount of power. ~~phantom victory~~ Somewhat frightened though we'd rightly be of the Frankenstein ^{presently} we thus created, we'd think of a ~~phantom victory~~ slogan admirably suitable to alleviate our - and which would of course be less demagogic than ever, others' - fears: we'd call the newest Germany "The Arsenal of Democracy". *understandable I insist in calling Mr. Morgenthau's creation*

Gruesome, isn't it? And yet, ~~phantom victory~~, grossly convincing. ^{to my worried mind}
But no matter whether or not the author of "Phantom Victory" has already ^{completely} been or is about to be vindicated, the fact remains that the Ruhr is scheduled to play a decisive part within the framework of the ^{a development which eliminates} outstanding Marshall plan, ~~phantom victory~~ one of the ~~phantom victory~~ initial objectives of the occupation: ~~phantom victory~~ Germany is not any longer meant to be rendered and kept harmless. Nor, as matters stand, could we possibly desire to control the German war potential in cooperation with our war time allies, against the most important of whom that war potential is likely to be employed. ^{be given a voice} be permitted to participate in the ^c Russia, to be sure, could not possibly ~~phantom victory~~ control of the Ruhr. - So far so logical. But what about De-nazification and de-militarisation? What about that highly advertised re-education of the German people? Need I tell you that - and why -

one again from the fact that since it
generally would lead to a more orderly

Concerning ~~the latter~~ ~~additional~~ a number of
~~the latter~~ ~~additional~~ obstacles kept
blocking its realisation. Initially, Germany's youth was ~~to be~~
taught to believe in peace and ~~look at the~~ United Nations as
as at

~~the all-powerful guarantor of~~
peace on earth. But will there be peace? And even if so, could anything
be more disunited than are the United Nations? How in the midst of the
cold war could we possibly convince the children of Germany that war
is now
~~an utter impossibility~~. And how, when unmitigated power
politics, when threats and counter-threats, when denunciations and
counter-denunciations have become the international order of the
day, are we to ~~make them believe in~~ civilized political
manners and international law?

Alright, then - and let's face it: ~~existing~~
world conditions have kept and are keeping us from carrying out the better
German For even Germany's
part of our occupation program. ~~economic~~
rehabilitation, ~~is far from having been achieved~~.

And here again, we failed because existing world conditions wouldn't
permit us to succeed. We want Germany to produce primarily such goods
as we ourselves or our European allies are likely to need. And we do not
want her to waste her efforts ~~on non-essential products~~. Her export has
to be strictly controlled; in fact, she mustn't be permitted to export
anything of potential value to her benevolent conquerors, who, incidental
do not wish her ~~in any way to compete with them on the world's scant~~
markets. But then, the Germans are industrious, they are ~~stubborn~~
and while they ~~love~~ their own domestic dictators, they hate to be
dictated to by others. How, then, since we'd thought it wise to invest
them with a great deal of self-determination, were we to keep them

Existed
Hence
Con
dict
It was
in
Prague
the

We always loved

more liberal
dependent

Grand

See what I mean?

The currency, production and ~~the~~ trade situation is one of the reasons why another of our occupation aims - our plan to make the Germans fairly happy, to make them like us and ~~the~~ eventually to turn them into ^{useful} member of the great democratic family of nations - failed to be achieved. They are not happy, they don't like us a bit and they are very far from becoming useful members of any family.

What he exists, in a delectable, strange contradiction between
certain, incidentally, *the average*

In ~~some~~ respects out performance all over Western Europe

seems strangely contradictory - ~~and~~ the accent ought to be put on
seems. Even its name declares that the ERP the European Recovery
Program is meant to ~~serve~~ ~~European Recovery~~ ~~Program~~ which it is actually doing
in a very way. ~~It is done~~
- ~~to~~ ~~moderate~~ ~~France~~, for example, keeps receiving
for armaments

a lot of money, some food, large amount of army surplus goods and much military and political lets call it advise. None of this, however, will enable, or even permit her to get back on her feet, to become a healthy, independent power, as long as she is prevented freely and advantageously to trade with other nations. And prevented she is - if not wholly, at least to a crippling degree. As a Marsh, all plan countries she must not, of course, export to the East anything that might be useful to the East and since the East won't buy anything useless, France's trade with the East cannot but be rather limited. she might, her stuff - quite some of it - sell to Britain. Britain, however, must not according to her contract with Uncle Sam discriminate against the United States; -

whatever is available here must be bought here and it must not be bought in France or anywhere else. It's a sorry deal for both Britain and France; for the former would ~~have to~~ ^{rather} ~~spend~~ ^{cheap} much ~~more~~ francs than sacred dollars, while the latter finds herself minus one of her most

But why, you may ask, doesn't good old France sell her goods right here? Surely, we want French wines and liqueurs, French perfume and the gorgeous output of the French haute couture? Here is why: In her eagerness to trade with the United States, France, some time ago, decided upon a most drastic devaluation of the Franc. French import to the United States which up to then had been too costly for the average American shopper were now to be had at exactly half the initial cost. Or so the French figured, quite erroneously, as it happened. For no sooner had the franc been cut in half than the American import taxes on French goods were duly increased with the result that in our friends, - the very people whose economic recovery we show such ardent interest - won't be able to sell us more than they were prior to that date. No more than they could before this daring and costly devaluation, the only difference being that they are getting only half the proper price. To make matters even more amusing: a special which, you may be certain, that wine country isn't any too eager to conclude American trade treaty with France provides for millions worth of Californian wine to be purchased by the French. Personally I happen to be very fond of Californian wine but the very idea of shipping any of it to Burgundy or Bordeaux strikes me as a slightly astonishing.

Two weeks ago, a friend of mine, a fourth generation American married to a Dutchman, returned from her first post war trip to Europe. And while she was much impressed with many of the things she saw, she spoke mainly and with a great deal of badly hurt feeling of the appalling lack of popularity of the U.S. "Far from being grateful for all that we are doing for them", she told me, "they actually dislike us. They resent our wealth and our power and what they call

our continuous meddling in their European affairs. And they also
fear that ^{one of these days} we'll start the atomic war with Europe as its chief battle-
field."

Saddening though I found it,
~~Shhhh~~~~hhgh~~~~hhghn~~~~nfnnnnn~~, her report came as no surp rise
 year I'd heard ~~hhahhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhh~~
 to me. Last ~~naahn~~~~fianhhhhh~~ very similar views expressed all over
comp was *in Holland, 5-6-48*
 Europe. It was ~~over there too~~, that Ib first learner about that little
 French lady in Washington, the secretary to a French diplomate , - etc.
 (story until end of page).

in that case
Well, the Dutch seemed to feel that it would'nt take more than
250 to take care of Western Europe as well, and somehow, they didn't like
it. *the idea*

As for the Germans, the A bomb appears to be the least of their
worries. ~~hnhh~~ In fact many Germans and particularly many leading
Germans are delighted with the Russian American conflict and can
hardly wait to see the cold war turn into a hot one.

Ever since June 1941 when Russia entered the war on the
side of great Britain the Nazis liked to fancy that one blessed
day the Soviet-anglo-saxon alliance would break up, the East would
turn against the West or vice versa and Germany would join the
side most likely to win. On the very eve of defeat and disaster,
Hitler clung to this concept as one drowning clings to a blade of
straw. The half crazed conversations held during those last days and
nights in the air raid shelter of his chancellery testify to the
Fuehrer's obsession by this great white hope. 'I've seen some of the
stenographic reports drawn up with typical German thoroughness by his
frenzied secretaries and they all relate that until the very last
moment the trapped monster kept raving about that break to come.

And wasn't he almost right? ~~May he not indeed yet prove to have~~
~~been completely right?~~ Perhaps it was folly for him to hope for the
Russian-American collision in May 1945. But today, - only three and
~~ahygonanwhobfandehghbhenbhtimabehhewitababityphofnbhanncohhishionniah~~
a half years later - ~~ghhhhhb hhhhhennphhbnabhhedhahfbonhghnh~~
anyone who'd deny the probability, proximity and even the inevitability
of that collision is liable to be called a fool.

22
The Germans, at any rate ~~or at least many~~, *far* too many German
~~have come to~~

They have - far too many of them -

1945
have come to consider their defeat in ~~world war two~~ but a lost battle; the ~~war~~, they contend, has never ended; the uneasy lull that ~~shhhhhn~~ interrupted it in 1945 has been growing *3.5 years ago* more uneasy *constant* ~~ever~~ since and by now the day is near when Marshall Plan Germany will be given a new and exhilarating chance to win the final round. *asa 338 124111*
Bombings? Death? Destruction? The annihilation of entire nations and countries? The abolition of civilisation itself? Never mind. The Germans are morbidly fond of the catastrophical - even when catastrophe befalls themselves. *in itself* And sayings *single popular German* such as "better an end with horror than a horror without end" are altogether characteristic of their *the German soul* psychological makeup.

huz
pulpy That they should consider the occupation a horror *have done* is easily understood. In fact, they would so ~~hh~~ even if ~~shhhhhhhhhhh~~ the occupying powers had *behaved magnificently* ~~given a flawless performance.~~ *both superficial and hhhh hhhh* As it goes there are so many flaws, ~~shhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhh~~ *which* essential ~~hhhh~~ disfigure our face in Germany's eyes that we can't really expect to be thought beautiful.

Not as if, incidentally, the Germans liked any of their conquerors. They dislike them in various ways and degrees. They despise the French without actually hating them. Victors who failed to win, the French to the German mind, deserve but resentful contempt. As for the British they still seem to command more respect than any of the other "invaders". The Germans have always had a great deal of envious admiration for the British whom they consider something like a master race in their own right. If today that master-race would seem to have lost much of its former power, ~~shhhhhhhhhhh~~ it may yet stage a triumphant come back. And if for

Not as if, necessarily,
they'd like the known
character with particular
dislike. They don't like
the character of their conquerors,
the white man's
dislike that in your
eyes and degrees.

characterizes the German reaction to our aid

a while all Germany, including the Fuehrer, expected Britain to have degenerated to a degree which would facilitate a German victory, they learned better in 1940 and ~~that the British had not~~ the lesson has not been forgotten.

Regarding both the Russians and the Americans most Germans agree that ~~that the Russians and the Americans~~ they are ^{equally} primitive, un--cultured and ignorant of the "higher" whatever that's meant to be. Although the average German doesn't like communism and consequently prefers the American regime, he'll ~~insist that~~ ^{basic} no ^{basic} difference exists between Ivan and Joe. "The Americans," I have heard him say, "are nothing but Russians with creases in their pants."

*Evans
call them
seems*

And although ^{general} conditions in the Western zones are undeniably somewhat better than in the East, few Germans choose to take notice of what's being done for them. But then, as I've said before, few Germans ~~that we are really trying to make Germany~~ doubt that ~~that we are really trying to make Germany~~ "The Arsenal of Democracy" Be this as it may, the following conversation which is said to have taken place between a Military government Major and his Fraeulein ^{conveys the German opinion of our reconstruction program:} secretary ~~secretary~~ "Well, Fraeulein" says the Major, "what do you think: how long will it take you people to get back on your feet?"

"It all depends" says the Fraeulein; "it all depends. If you Americans continue to help us the way you do, it may take about 30 years."

"30 years!" Cries the major; "but my dear child we couldn't possibly help you that long; in fact we may quit helping

right
you after the elections."

"In that case" says the Fraeulein, "We'll be back on our feet by Christmas."

It just goes to show you. There is much that I might add
general ~~performance~~ ⁵⁴² concerning the German attitude of which I've made a painfully
through study. Suffice it to repeat though, that on the whole
post Hitlerian Germany isn't any less arrogant, any less ~~not~~ ^{and} ~~nationalistic~~
~~aggressive~~ ^{and} nationalistic, any more democratic, any more
trustworthy than was the Kaiser's and the Fuehrer's Reich. I'd better
repeat, too, that the example set by the victorious world was ~~is~~
scarcely suited to ~~h~~ revive, encourage and strengthen the
better Germany.

For the rest it isn't really the Germans who matter
decisively. They are but the pawns in the struggle.
Thus far - though probably not forever - they are but pawns
in the hands of the British and the Americans. Now what about
those who are on the gigantic chess-board across which
Russia and the United States face each other.

What, then, about those two and their frightening
game? What about the nature and history of a crisis which may well
lead to
~~ghghghgh~~ disaster?

Let's presume that we don't want war - and I am
sacredly convinced that with a few, ^{large} if unfortunately fairly influential
exceptions - the American people don't want war. If this be true
what we want is peace - not by any means appeasement, mind you, but
the ^{reasonable} ~~hahhahhah~~ settlement of our conflict with Russia, an honest and
durable understanding with the Soviet Union. ~~Now in order to arrive~~
~~at such an understanding with the Soviet Union, we must first under-~~

The Western reaction to this rather utopian declaration was strong and
it was unmistakable. ~~do everything in their considerable power~~
Not only did the Western allies ~~abandon~~
all that was
~~abandon~~ morally and financially to back the
white, counter-revolutionary Russian Generals, they actually went so
far as to send troops into Russia, mere token forces to be certain,
but soldiers nevertheless. *view. Evidently he thought we'd undo*
If at all possible, ~~the revolution was to be~~
~~undone~~. The revolution, *had to be what impossible* however, wouldn't be undone. In due time our
troops were withdrawn and our protégés, the white generals, gradually
disappeared from the scene. None of which meant the actual end of *all*
~~the~~ Western-Soviet hostilities.

Britain from the very outset and beginning with the impudent self-scuttling of the German fleet at Scappa Flow, closed her eyes to each and every ^{German} violation of the Versailles treaty; why she permitted and in some cases even ^{made possible} ~~facilitated~~ the various ^{military} expeditions of the illegal "Free Corps", the forerunners, as it went, of Hitler's Brownshirts; and that is why, after 1918, ^{just} as after 1945 Germany was ^{not} never really meant to be rendered harmless. Had there been no Soviet Russia then, Germany might have been eliminated as a military power. And were there no Soviet Russia today, Germany wouldn't be on the verge of being nominated the Arsenal of Democracy.

Yet for all Western apprehension regarding the red colossus to the East there was not between the two world wars any evidence of actual or threatened Russian aggression. For the time ^{being} ~~even~~ the world revolution was dropped from the Soviet program and up to her invasion of Finland the Soviet Union ~~whahshahnn~~ conducted a consistently peaceable foreign policy. Perhaps she was merely too weak to attack. ^{or perhaps in early '30} ~~Even~~ Even if so, the West might have revised its notions of what constituted a menace to the peace of the world. One might have listened to ~~nnnnnnnnnnnnnn~~ the imploring speeches that Mr. Litvinow never tired to make at Geneva; one might indeed have instituted that "collective security" for which the Russians kept clamoring and which in all probability would have averted the second world war. Instead one went on doing business with Hitler; one sacrificed ^{slaughtered Spain and other} ~~Austria~~ Austria, ^{undying} ~~sacrificed~~ Czechoslovakia, in the ~~hhhhhh~~ hope to see Nazi-Germany ^{attack and break} ~~turn~~ against the Soviet Union. Of course, you ^{know} ~~all~~ know that and how this hope was betrayed. ^{When,} ~~When~~ On August 21, 1939 Russia signed

a none-aggression and friendship pact with ~~him~~ Hitler's Reich,
it dawned even upon Mr. Chamberlain that there had been some grave
He never was so far from being
miscalculation and that the Fuehrer meant to finish the West first.

My friends, far, very far, be it from me to picture Russia
as an innocent victim of the world's foolish suspicions. By declaring
herself a world revolutionary power she herself *arouse* caused these suspicions
and ~~nothing~~ should not have been either hurt or surprised when the
world reacted as it did. All the less so since, despite her failure and
utter inability to carry out her world revolutionary program and
despite the peaceful character of her foreign policy, she kept ~~hacking~~
~~hacking~~ interfering with other countries' affairs by backing
and financing the communist parties which soon commenced to plague
every nation *on earth* ~~under the sun~~, serving as a continuous reminder of
Russia's ultimate plans. ~~Even so the~~ Even so the
over all Soviet performance prior to 1939 hardly justified the Western
policy up ~~to~~ *to* then. *Or could*
That policy on the other hand may not justify
but certainly explains *much* some of the ugliness of the present Soviet
however if somewhat simplified
performance. The cold truth is that the Western world never liked the
at least Soviet Union ; that it wanted Germany to destroy the Soviet Union;
sub that, when Germany was about to destroy the West instead, *nolens volens* the West welcomed
the Soviet Union as its most indispensable ally; and that, no sooner
than was the war over and won, the West returned to its original position:
and some again mean to employ
it ceased to like or trust or in any way assist the Soviet Union. There
as they
is much that the latter has done and keeps doing to foster hostile
feelings. We ought to understand, though, that Russia is afraid *of* and
has had some reason to be
that she has rightly been afraid ever since 1917. We also ought to

to be sure

remember that, according to our standards, Russia is a poor and backward country and one that has never known the blessings of freedom and justice for all. ^{and most uncivilized} Horrid methods have been used there at all times. Whenever one of her rulers was frightened he tried ^f to outrighten those whom he feared. Now obviously, we have no intention of being out-big bad bear. frightened by the ~~Soviet Union~~. But just what are our intentions? As I think I have proved, the ~~the~~ history of our - the Western - relationship with the Soviet Union consists of one gigantic vicious circle. And unless we wish our planet to commit atomic suicide we'd better break that vicious circle and break it soon. It can be done. We could, without losing face, endeavour to convince our former allies that we are not their ^{actual} ~~enemies~~ ^{European} foes; that we are not plotting war; that we mean re-construction when we say European reconstruction and that we do not merely mean to knock our Western European dependents into military ^{top} shape. ~~Germany~~ Our main theme tonight has been Germany and the occupation. Now ~~Germany is~~ ^{Germany} is ~~a place as good as, and probably better~~ ^{one} than, any other, in which we might demonstrate our determination to keep the peace. Let's start to encourage and to back the better elements that exist there as ^{of course} anywhere else and which ^{have} thus far been continually and increasingly frustrated. Let's show the bad ones in which, it is true, Germany is very rich, that their ^{nasty} hopes will not mature; that all their scheming and plotting is utterly futile because we are thinking and acting in terms of peace, not war. As for the occupation, let us return to our original goals and reach them. Let us de-nazify, demilitarize and re-educate the German people by employing the only ^{most good} ~~means~~ likely to succeed: let's set an example; let us show them that America for one is not out to dominate the world and that we are actually bent on making

in January

this star a better place to live in. Let us in China and India, in Africa and in the Middle East steal the soviet show by siding with the people and sponsoring ~~ahhhhhhhhhhh~~ economic, as well as political democracy rather than ~~siding with~~ ^{consistently} privileged minorities and keeping them in power by means anything but democratic. Let's mean what we say and say what we mean; ~~ahh~~ ^{h h h h} let's act accordingly; and then let's see whether humanity will insist on ~~committing~~ ^{backing} suicide. Personally, I continue to ~~believe~~ ^{believe} that the impermissible will not be permitted. Fortunately or unfortunately, as pessimists might put it - it's all still up to us. I, being ~~frankly~~ ^{I, being} ~~an~~ ^{an} ~~optimist~~ ^{optimist}; ~~loving~~ ^{loving} the United States and ~~having~~ ^{having} faith in the sound sense and essential justice of her people, I say fortunately.

.....-